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1. Introduction 
The 1990s have been characterised by an international trend towards greater accountability in 
government. All levels of government in a number of countries are now obliged to display 
transparency in policy formulation and implementation, which includes the full and frank disclosure 
of financial transactions. This focus on accountability means that governments must present a clear 
and readily accessible account of all revenue-raising and expenditure decisions. In many countries, 
and especially those with a federal system of government, this has also led to a reexamination of the 
financial relationships between the federal, state and local jurisdictions. The hypothesised ability of 
governments to obscure the real costs of public sector activity through fiscal illusion has once again 
emerged as a key question in the analysis of government spending and taxing. 
The concept of fiscal illusion revolves around the proposition that the true costs and benefits of 
government may be consistently misconstrued by the citizenry of a given fiscal jurisdiction.  The 
origins of this argument can be traced back at least as far as J.R. McCullock and J.S. Mill.  For 
instance, in his A Treatise on the Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System 
McCulloch developed several of the principles underlying the modern analysis of fiscal illusion.  
Thus he contended that direct taxation involved less fiscal illusion than indirect taxation since direct 
taxation imposes a more obvious burden on taxpayers.  Similarly, McCulloch argued that taxpayers 
misperceived not only the costs of government activity but also its benefits.  J. S. Mill followed a 
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similar line in his Principles of Political Economy, although he placed much more emphasis on the 
resultant bias in government expenditure.  But perhaps the dominant influence in the development 
of the theory of fiscal illusion was Puviani (1967).  Although his approach has been criticised for 
being too general it did serve as the basis for the subsequent works of both Buchanan (1967) and 
Wagner (1976).  In its present form the theory of fiscal illusion owes much to Downs (1957) work 
on the economic theory of politics. Downs (1957, p. 148) argued that:   
 [I]t is rational for every individual to minimise his investment in political information, in spite 
of the fact that most citizens might benefit substantially if the whole electorate were well 
informed.  As a result, democratic political systems are bound to operate at less than 
maximum efficiency. 
The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion has been directed almost exclusively at the revenue side of 
the fiscal equation with a corresponding neglect of the benefits of public sector activity.  This 
asymmetry does not necessarily reflect the increased importance of government expenditure relative 
to government output.  As Goetz (1977, p. 177) has argued the reasons for this are somewhat more 
mundane: 
 It is not that the issue of over or undervaluation of the benefits of public goods is not a 
trenchant one.  Quite the contrary.  In the last analysis, however, assessments of the relative 
values of goods are intrinsically subjective and highly personal... there is little hope for 
establishing the truth or falsity of J. K. Galbraith's contention that the preference of 
Americans for automobiles over public goods is symptomatic of illusion. 
In any event, the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion has either taken the form of what Oates (1988, 
p.68) describes as ad hoc expenditure studies, like Wagner (1976), Breeden and Hunter (1985), 
Feenburg and Rosen (1987), Misiolek and Elder (1988), or work employing demand functions for 
public goods such as Bergstrom and Goodnam (1973), Wildasin (1989), Hayes (1989) and Crane 
(1990).  In both the expenditure and demand approaches a measure of budgetary size or budgetary 
growth is regressed against various socio-economic variables aimed at capturing those determinants 
present in the absence of fiscal illusion.  An indicator or proxy for the relevant illusionary variable 
is then added, so that a significant directional coefficient indicates the presence of fiscal illusion.  
The model itself typically takes the form E = αX + βF + u, where E is a measure of budgetary size, 
X is a vector of explanatory variables in the absence of fiscal illusion, F is a vector of variables 
intended to measure fiscal illusion, and u is the error term (Oates, 1988, p.68). 
Within this general approach, the empirical study of fiscal illusion has proceeded in five distinctive 
directions, each of which seeks to account for the putative existence of fiscal illusion.  The present 
paper attempts to review the literature in question within a common theoretical framework. 
The paper itself has been sub-divided into seven main areas.  Section 2 seeks to locate the five 
major empirical approaches within the analytical context provided by Wagner (1976).  Sections 3, 
4, 5, 6 and 7 examine in detail the empirical work on the revenue-complexity, revenue-elasticity, 
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the flypaper effect, the renter illusion, and fiscal illusion hypotheses respectively.  The paper ends 
with some brief concluding remarks in section 8. 
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2. A Common Theoretical Framework 
The five specific hypotheses underlying the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion can be illustrated in 
terms of a simple diagram developed by Wagner (1976, p.54) which is shown in Figure 1 below.  
Each of these hypotheses has attempted to model a process in which fiscal illusion causes citizens 
to underestimate the tax-price of a public good and so result in an oversupply of that good.  In 
Figure 1, X2 and P2 represent the tax-price and desired output of the public good in the absence of 
fiscal illusion, and the area 0P2aX2 the public budget (expenditure or revenue).  This is consistent 
with the socio-economic vector aX.  With the introduction of fiscal illusion the perceived tax-price 
falls to P1, desired output expands to X1 and the perceived budget is OP1cX1.  However, the actual 
budget is 0P2dX1 since the actual tax-price is still P2.  Empirical tests of fiscal illusion aim to 
evaluate the significance of the area X2adX1, the excess budget/revenue/expenditure attributable to 
the illusion vector βF. 
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FIGURE 1.  Modelling Fiscal Illusion  
The first hypothesis is revenue-complexity where the misperception of the tax-price results from 
fragmentation of the revenue system.  Studies by Wagner (1976), Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1978), Baker (1983) and Breeden and Hunter (1985) have sought to measure this effect.  In terms 
of Figure 1, the increasing complexity of the revenue system, or a fall in its level of simplicity, 
should cause a move in the perceived price of the public good down the vertical axis.  An extremely 
simple revenue structure on the other hand would be associated with the actual price P2.  Movement 
down the vertical axis is linked with higher levels of illusion and, as a result, more public goods.  
The second genre of work focuses on revenue-elasticity where growth in the level of public activity 
is associated with income elastic forms of taxation.  Oates (1975), Craig and Heins (1980), Hunter 
and Scott (1987) and Misiolek and Elder (1988) have examined revenue-elasticity empirically.  
Figure 1 would show the y-axis as being associated with the level of income elasticity of the 
revenue structure.  The higher the level of dependence on income-elastic revenue devices, or the 
lesser the proportion of revenue from inelastic sources, the higher the level of illusion, and the 
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higher the level of expenditure.  The third type of approach is the flypaper effect, where lump-sum 
grants and public utility profits exert a stimulatory effect on expenditures.  Contributions by 
DiLorenzo (1982b), Winer (1983), Logan (1986) and Grossman (1990) fall into this category.  
Figure 1 would show the vertical axis as being associated with the level of dependence on grants or 
public utility profits.  All other things being equal, the higher the level of dependence on grants and 
public utility profits, or the lower the proportion of revenue from other sources, the higher the level 
of illusion, and therefore expenditure.  The fourth area centres on renter illusion, where fiscal 
illusion is related to the level of property ownership in a fiscal jurisdiction.  Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) and Martinez-Vazquez (1983) provide examples of this kind of work.  The 
vertical axis in Figure 1 would then illustrate the proportion of owner-occupiers in a given 
jurisdiction.  The lower the proportion of owners, or the higher the level of renters, the higher the 
degree of fiscal illusion, and the higher the level of public good provision.  Finally, the situation 
where debt provides illusionary effects has been investigated.  Oates (1972), Epple and Schipper 
(1981) and Dalamagas (1993) have undertaken empirical work in this area.  Figure 1 would show 
that as a jurisdiction increasingly relied on debt, or as the proportion of revenue from taxes falls, the 
level of fiscal illusion would increase, and as a result the level of public good expenditure would 
also increase.  Empirical work on each of these five hypotheses will now be examined in more 
detail. 
 
3. Revenue-Complexity Hypothesis 
The first source of fiscal illusion to be examined derives from revenue structure complexity.  
Initially defined by Buchanan in 1967, the roots of the revenue-complexity hypothesis apparently 
date to the work of Puviani in 1903.  Buchanan (1967, p. 135) has argued that "...to the extent that 
the total tax load on an individual can be fragmented so that he confronts numerous small levies 
rather than a few significant ones, illusionary effects may be created".  Thus it is increasingly 
difficult for the tax-payer to identify the tax-price of public sector activities and more likely that 
total tax liability of public output is underestimated. Moreover, even if the tax-payer can identify 
the various tax sources, the marginal costs of procuring full information may quickly outweigh any 
marginal benefits.  Consequently, the revenue complexity hypothesis predicts the more complex the 
revenue system, the larger will be the level of public expenditure ceteris paribus. 
The seminal study of the revenue-complexity hypothesis was undertaken by Wagner in 1976.  
Wagner argued that a fiscal system was characterised by the composition and predilection of fiscal 
extraction devices (FEDs).  Wagner proposed that as a revenue-raising system became more 
complex, the FEDs diversified, spatially, temporally, and in terms of obtrusiveness (Wagner, 1976, 
p. 51).  The rationale for such behaviour was to mask the extent of revenues transferred from 
taxpayers to the fiscus.  As a result of diversification, Wagner (1976) posited that the formation of 
perceptual hypothesises and the securement of data become so demanding that it raises the marginal 
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cost of inquiry significantly.  Moreover, since the marginal benefit of forming an accurate 
hypothesis on a fiscal variable is less in collective choice than market choice, Wagner asserted that 
an increase in revenue-complexity would ceteris paribus  increase the level of public expenditure.  
Wagner (1976) approached the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion by regressing total current 
expenditure against various socio-economic demand variables and a measure of revenue structure 
simplicity - the Herfindahl index of concentration. The Herfindahl index CRS (complexity of 
revenue system) is  CRS j   =   ( REV i ) 2   
i =   1 
n 
, so that REVij represents the i-th tax instrument's revenue share 
of the total revenue amount of the j-th jurisdiction.  Moreover (0 < CRS _ 1). A complex revenue 
system would be associated with a relatively low CRS whilst a simple revenue system would have 
an index approaching 1.  At the extremes a revenue system characterised by four equal FEDs would 
have an index of 0.25 whilst one with a singular FED would have an index of 1. The selection of 
the Herfindahl index as a measure of revenue simplicity was to become one of Wagner's most 
enduring contributions, since virtually all subsequent studies of the revenue-complexity model have 
employed this index as a measure of the illusion variable (Oates, 1988, p. 69). Wagner's analysis of 
local government expenditure was likewise instrumental in focusing later studies on local public 
goods. In Wagner's analysis the expected sign of the revenue-complexity variable was negative and 
significant.  Indeed, Wagner (1976, p. 57) used the results to propose that an adjustment of the 
revenue system to an extreme level of simplicity would entail a fall in expenditures of 33.06%!  
Despite the apparent success of Wagner's analysis in identifying fiscal illusion as a result of 
revenue-complexity, subsequent studies and Wagner himself acknowledged some serious 
deficiencies (Wagner, 1976; Oates, 1988; Munley and Greene, 1978; Misiolek and Elder, 1988).  
Firstly, the selected measure of revenue-complexity, the Herfindahl index, failed to take into 
account the perceived visibility of revenue classes. Oates (1988, p. 70), for example, noted that 
charges and fees for government services emphasised the cost of these goods and services more 
than equivalent exise taxes.  The possibility that Wagner's regression equation may have well been 
misspecified (and hence biased) prompted subsequent studies to include "visibility" weightings 
(see, for example, Clotfelter, 1976; Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Breeden and Hunter, 1985; 
Henrekson, 1988; Misiolek and Elder, 1988). Secondly, whilst Wagner incorporated qualitative 
measures of population (for example, percentages below the poverty line and proportion urbanised) 
the lack of population quantity as an independent variable, or the use of per capita expenditures, 
opened the model to significant bias via equation misspecification. Munley and Greene (1978) (see 
Table 1) using identical data to Wagner, found that the misspecified equation incorporated 
substantial heteroskedasticity, and that the use of the generalised least squares (GLS) procedure 
resulted in revenue structure being no longer significant. They also found that Wagner's use of 
published data had unnecessarily restricted the measure of revenue-complexity (Wagner's four 
revenue categories as against Munley and Greene's nine). After modifying the equation for either 
population or per capita measures, revenue structure, whilst still negative, was insignificant, which 
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may indicate that Wagner's results were somewhat fragile. Subsequent analysis by Misiolek and 
Elder (1988) yielded similar results. 
Despite the damning evidence provided by Clotfelter (1976), Munley and Greene (1978), and 
Misiolek and Elder (1988), four post-Wagnerian studies provided support for the revenue-
complexity hypothesis.  Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) analysed Swiss municipalities and 
found that weighting of the revenue-complexity index by visibility significantly improved the 
explanatory power of Wagner's basic model. The study also indicated that the fiscal distortion 
indicated in the revenue-complexity hypothesis was more likely to be pronounced in indirect as 
against direct democracies. Baker (1983) used US state data on a per capita basis, and found that 
revenue-complexity was significant and negative in terms of fiscal change. After an analysis of data 
drawn from thirty-seven U.S. cities, Breeden and Hunter (1985) concluded that relatively narrowly-
based taxation systems yield less revenue than relatively diffuse and broadly-based taxation 
systems. Finally, a British study by Cullis and Jones (1987, p. 226) provided evidence for 
widespread ignorance regarding revenues without establishing the existence of fiscal illusion per se. 
Whilst the empirical studies on average tend to offer considerable support for the revenue-
complexity hypothesis, critics have argued that the basic assumptions of the model are seriously 
flawed.  Put differently, there are accusations that either the assumed causal linkage between 
revenue-complexity and revenue levels is incorrect, or that alternative hypotheses exist (other than 
fiscal illusion) for revenue-complexity and the growth of government (Wagner, 1976; Breeden and 
Hunter, 1985; Borcherding, 1985; Anderson, Wallace and Warner, 1986; Oates, 1988; Misiolek and 
Elder, 1988).  Political agents may well be subject to considerations of both  budget maximisation 
and burden minimisation, determining fiscal structure in light of their own self-interest and that of 
their constituents (Wagner, 1976, p. 58). This may throw doubt on the traditional motivations for 
revenue-diversification. Oates (1988, p. 71) approached the question slightly differently by arguing 
that two competing hypotheses existed; revenue-complexity and what he termed revenue-
diversification. He postulated that in order to prevent producer and consumer mobility across 
jurisdictional borders on the basis of tax inducements, officials will introduce new sources of 
revenue rather than increase existing tax rates. Accordingly, jurisdictions with relatively high levels 
of spending are associated with more diversified revenue systems, rather than the causal 
relationship of diversified revenue systems and expenditure offered by the fiscal illusion literature. 
Oates suggests that past studies are therefore compromised on the basis of simultaneous equation 
bias (estimates will be biased and inconsistent, tests of hypothesis on parameters will be invalid). 
Misiolek and Elder (1988, p. 233) approached the question of causality by arguing that a conflict 
existed between fiscal illusion (tax diversification resulting from inaccurate or incomplete 
information) and fiscal stress (tax diversification as a result of the need for revenue stabilisation).  
They regarded the revenue simplicity measure utilised in past studies of fiscal illusion as a measure 
of risk-reducing revenue diversification (Misiolek and Elder, 1988, p. 233). In their empirical 
analysis of forty-eight US states, Misiolek and Elder found little evidence in favour of fiscal illusion 
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but some support for the fiscal stress argument that revenue variability may affect the size of 
government.  
TABLE 1. 
Summary of major studies of the revenue-complexity hypothesis 
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Wagner 
(1976) 
50 US 
cities 
Cross-
sectional 
1970  
OLS Total current 
expenditure 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity. 
Total personal income, 
intergovernmental revenue, 
percentage of population 
below poverty line, av. salary 
of city employees, local 
expenditure as a percentage 
of total, population density. 
Simplicity of 
revenue 
structure 
significantly 
negative. 
Clotfelter 
(1976) 
50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
TSLS Per capita 
expenditure 
and per 
capita 
revenue. 
Ratio of direct 
to indirect 
taxes. 
Wage rate, income, 
population, public tertiary 
education enrolment ratio, 
various measures of 
education revenue simplicity. 
Simplicity of 
revenue 
structure 
negative 
though 
insignificant. 
Pommerehne 
and 
Schneider 
(1978) 
110 Swiss 
cities 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS Per capita 
expenditures 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity 
with different 
visibility 
weightings. 
Income, tax-price, 
population. 
Simplicity of 
revenue 
significantly 
negative 
depending on 
weighting of 
visibility. 
Munley and 
Greene 
(1978) 
50 US 
cities 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS/GLS Total current 
expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per capita 
expenditures. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
Total personal income, 
intergovernmental revenue, 
percentage of population 
below poverty line, average 
salary of city employees, 
local expenditure as a 
percentage of total, city 
population as a percentage of 
total area, population 
density. 
 
Total personal income per 
capita, intergovernmental 
revenue per capita, 
percentage of population 
below poverty line, average 
salary of city employees, 
local expenditure as a 
percentage of total, city 
population as a percentage of 
total area, population 
density, population. 
Model 
(Wagner) 
prone to bias 
on the basis 
of equation 
specification.  
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue 
structure 
simplicity 
negative 
though 
insignificant. 
Baker (1983) 50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
1975 
 
OLS Voter tax 
cost 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
Per capita: income, mineral 
shipments, motel receipts, 
manufacturing value added, 
debt lagged one year, 
percentage of males with 
education < 12 years, tax 
structure elasticity measure 
(mean for average income 
return). 
Simplicity of 
revenue 
structure 
negative and 
significant. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Breeden and 
Hunter 
(1985) 
37 US 
cities 
Cross-
sectional 
1975 
OLS Per capita 
total city 
revenue 
Measure of 
breadth of 
revenue 
system 
(number of 
different 
instruments). 
Per capita income, per 
capita federal revenue, per 
capita state revenue, 
dummies for dependence on 
general stales taxes, select 
sales taxes, license fees, 
charges, property taxes, city 
area.  
Simplicity 
measure 
negative and 
significant, 
breadth of 
revenue 
system 
positive and 
significant. 
Cullis and 
Jones  
(1987) 
UK survey 
1981 
Descriptive
statistics 
Visibility of 
central 
government 
revenue 
sources. 
Not applicable Various UK revenue 
classifications. 
Significant 
illusion in 
terms of 
identifying 
revenue 
sources.  
Henrekson 
(1988) 
Sweden  
Time-
series 
1950-1984 
OLS Government 
consumption, 
investment 
and transfer 
expenditures. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
ratio of direct 
to indirect 
taxes. 
Urban population, GDP, 
non-labour force population 
as a proportion of total, ratio 
of median to mean income, 
ratio of net exports to GDP, 
proportion of unionised to 
non-unionised labour, 
inflation. 
Simplicity of 
revenue 
structure in-
significantly 
positive. 
Misiolek and 
Elder  
(1988) 
50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
1984 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Real tax 
revenues per 
capita, real 
state-local 
expenditures 
per capita. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity, 
visible tax 
concentration 
ratio. 
Per capita personal income, 
population, average monthly 
salary of state-local 
employees, dummy for state 
expenditure limit, tax export 
measure, variability of taxes 
over period, variance of 
income over period, state 
share of state-local 
expenditures. 
Measures of 
revenue 
structure 
simplicity 
and visibility 
insignificant.  
Martinez-
Vazquez, 
Harwood, 
Larkins 
(1992) 
US survey 
data 
1991 
Desciptive 
statistics 
Various 
questions on 
withholding 
vs. lump-sum 
taxation 
Not applicable Effect of withholding on tax 
compliance. 
No evidence 
of fiscal 
illusion in 
terms of 
income tax 
complexity. 
Heyndels 
and 
Smolders 
(1994) 
302 
Flemish 
municipal-
ities Cross-
sectional  
1990 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditure. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity , 
percentage 
non-owner 
occupied, 
grant income 
divided by 
total income. 
Population, median voter tax 
share, median voter total 
disposable income. 
Complexity 
of revenue 
system has a 
positive and 
significant 
impact on 
expenditures. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Worthington 
(1994) 
46 
Austral-
ian LGAs 
Cross-
sectional 
1991 
OLS TSLS 
(linear and 
log-linear) 
Total and per 
capita 
expenditure. 
Proportion 
owner-
occupied, 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
dummies for 
grant and 
utility 
reliance, 
indirectness of 
revenue 
system. 
Rateable area, rateable 
roads, median voter tax 
price, median voter income, 
population, proportion of 
population over 65 years. 
Complexity 
of revenue 
system 
positive and 
significant 
impact on 
expenditures. 
Revenue 
system 
determined 
exogenously 
to level of 
expenditure. 
Dollery and 
Worthington 
(1995a) 
7 
Australian 
states. 
Pooled 
time-series, 
cross-
sectional 
(1982-
1992) 
OLS and 
GLS 
(linear and 
log-linear) 
Total 
expenditure 
and total 
expenditure 
net of grants 
and transfers. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity, ratio 
of direct to 
indirect taxes, 
dummy 
variables for 
reliance on 
grant income. 
Population, median voter 
income, proportion of 
poulation under 19 years, 
proportion of population 
over 65 years, population 
density, dummies for large 
and small states. 
Complexity 
of revenue 
system 
positive and 
significant 
impact on 
expenditures. 
(a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies, intervals time series. Where two dates are given, different years for some cross-
sectional variables have been used. (b) OLS/GLS/TSLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares and Two-Stage Least 
Squares respectively. (c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated. (d) Italicised 
independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
 
4. Revenue-Elasticity Hypothesis 
The second form of fiscal illusion derives from the income elasticity of the revenue system.  In this 
approach, revenue systems characterised by a high degree of income elasticity will attract larger 
increments in general income, and this increase will be "automatically" funnelled into increased 
expenditure. In other words, a clear deterministic relationship exists between the "automatic" 
increases in revenue found under an income elastic revenue structure and increased expenditure 
ceteris paribus.  But as Oates (1975, p. 141) has caustically observed: 
 But why should people care about the income elasticity of the tax structure?  What the 
proposition under study seems to imply is that people will not object to increases in public 
expenditure if they can be funded with no increase in tax rates (that is, from increments to 
revenues resulting solely from growth in income), but they will not support an expanded 
public budget if it requires a rise in tax rates.  This suggests what people care about is not 
their tax bill, but rather their tax rate. Viewed this way, the hypothesis simply is not 
consistent with our conventional description of rational behaviour; it implies that consumer-
taxpayers are subject to a kind of 'fiscal illusion' (original emphasis). 
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The first major study of the revenue-elasticity hypothesis was undertaken by Oates in 1975.  The 
study began by regressing US state expenditures against various socio-economic variables, along 
with a measure of the income elasticity of the revenue structure (see Table 2).  The hypothesis held 
that in addition to the determinants of growth in expenditure indicated by the various socio-
economic variables, the income elasticity of the tax structure would exert a positive influence 
(Oates, 1975, p. 146).  The process was repeated in an almost identical form for a selection of 
thirty-three US cities, and in a slightly modified model for a selection of fifty-seven countries.  The 
results prompted Oates (1975, p. 156) to conclude that tax elasticity seems to be positively related 
to the growth of the public expenditure. 
Despite the apparent "success" of these empirical studies, Oates himself was loathe to 
unambiguously accept the findings.  In fact he suggested that the analysis had been compromised in 
several ways.  Firstly, in common with many studies of fiscal illusion, some of the socio-economic 
variables were presumed to be endogenous, notably grant-matching state and federal funds.  This 
problem was rectified in the Oates analysis by the use of a two-stage least squares regression and 
the addition of variables associated with the level of intergovernmental grants.  The procedure 
caused the the income-elasticity variable to lose a substantial amount of explanatory power (Oates, 
1975, p. 156).  Secondly, Oates (1975) had analysed state and city data over a period associated 
with rapid budgetary growth, which he believed may have exaggerated the significance of the 
revenue-elasticity hypothesis.  He posited that in the long-run the income elastcity of the tax system 
will probably not have a significant impact on the growth of the public sector. Thirdly, Oates 
observed that the proxies he had used for the income elasticity of the revenue systems were far from 
satisfactory.  In particular, governmental estimates were suitable for single years only, and measures 
using the proportion of income tax revenue to total revenues provided only a reasonable 
approximation. Despite this Oates' (1975) approximation was employed by DiLorenzo (1982a), 
Baker (1983), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Heyndels and Smolders (1994) and Dollery and 
Worthington (1995a), whilst the ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) 
elasticity estimates were used by Craig and Heins (1980). Finally, Oates (1975, p. 143) admitted 
that he was uncomfortable with the notion of revenue-elasticity being "a hypothesis founded solely 
on irrational behaviour".  Put differently, the fiscal illusion hypothesis held that tax rates not tax 
bills would dominate taxpayer perceptions, even in the presence of full information. Oates reasoned 
more compelling and acceptable evidence must exist.  He argued inter alia  fiscal illusion may 
depend in some way on the political mechanism and could thus still be consistent with rational 
individual behaviour (Oates, 1975, p. 143).  Such a conclusion he felt could be supported by either 
the transaction cost theory of Wagner (1976) or the rational taxpayer ignorance theory proposed by 
Downs (1957). Wagner (1976) proposed that the habitual behaviour of legislators in selecting an 
income elastic revenue system was more efficient than the frequent and costly adjustments 
associated with continual reexaminations. But in the sense that it does not rely on imperfect 
information or misperceptions it cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive of the theory of fiscal 
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illusion (Oates, 1988, p. 75).  Downs (1957, p. 147) argued that ignorance (not irrationality) of the 
public budget was a highly rational response to the facts of political life in a large democracy.   
Subsequent studies have provided mixed support for the revenue-elasticity hypothesis (see Table 2).  
Craig and Heins (1980) found a positive and significant relationship, but accepted that their 
empirical observations were supported by US state moves to install legislative limits on expenditure 
as a proportion of income.  DiLorenzo (1982a) in an analysis of sixty-six county jurisdictions found 
that revenue elasticity was negative and insignificant as a determinant to expenditure, a result in his 
estimation influenced by the presence of Tiebout mobility. Tiebout mobility infers that at the local 
level, expenditure and tax differentials will affect the choice of residential location ceteris paribus. 
The migration of taxpayers away from more income elastic local areas (with their higher tax bills) 
would reduce the demand for expenditure growth, thereby underestimating the expansionary effect 
of income elastic revenue structures (Craig and Heins, 1980; DiLorenzo, 1982a). Baker (1983) 
found little support for the revenue-elasticity hypothesis when examined in conjunction with the 
revenue-complexity hypothesis, and Feenburg and Rosen (1987, p. 200) concluded that there is no 
evidence that income elastic tax structures generate higher rates of growth in the public sector. In an 
alternative approach to the question of tax structures Hunter and Scott (1987), and later Greene and 
Hawley (1991) found that the probability of a tax rate cut increased when US states had more 
income elastic revenue systems. This questioned the revenue-elasticity hypothesis that elastic 
structures were exploited by political agents to gain higher levels of expenditure. It should be noted 
that Feenburg and Rosen (1987), Hunter and Scott (1987) and Greene and Hawley (1991) share a 
proxy for revenue-elasticity different to that employed by Oates (1975). Using a sample of 25 000 
Federal Income Tax returns, Feenburg and Rosen (1987), and later Greene and Hawley (1991), 
estimated state personal income and sales tax liabilities for each unit, and then calculated the 
elasticities of the income and sales tax systems assuming an increase in income of one percent. 
Hunter and Scott (1986; 1987), on the other hand used a Gini coefficient assuming equal 
distribution of income across income levels to construct their measure of system progressivity. 
Finally, Misiolek and Elder (1988, p. 242) found that tax elasticity was significant only when the 
dependent variable was tax revenue. 
The main problem surrounding past empirical studies of the revenue-elasticity hypothesis appears to 
be that researchers, whilst reluctant to dismiss the intuitive appeal of the model, are frustrated by 
the lack of a suitable measure of income elasticity.  It is also apparent that whilst alternative 
explanations for revenue elasticity are not mutually exclusive, in the case of transactions costs and 
illusion it  may not be possible to conclude that on the basis of the revenue elasticty hypothesis 
alone that this represents a distinct form of fiscal illusion (Oates, 1988, p. 76). 
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TABLE 2. 
Summary of major studies of the revenue-elasticity hypothesis 
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Oates  
(1975) 
48 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
Changes 
between 
1960 and 
1970 
33 US 
cities 
Cross-
sectional 
Changes 
between 
1960 and 
1970 
OLS and 
TSLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Per capita 
general 
expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
revenues as a 
percentage of 
national 
income 
ACIR 
revenue-
elasticity, 
individual 
income tax es, 
corporation 
income taxes, 
total income 
tax receipts as 
a percentage 
of total tax 
receipts. 
Median family income, 
percentage of families below 
poverty line, population, 
federal grants per capita and 
state-local share of total 
expenditure (under TSLS),  
GDP per capita, total 
exports as a percentage of 
GDP, measure of income 
elasticity of tax structure 
(income tax as a percentage 
of total revenues). 
Measure of 
tax elasticity 
positive and 
significant in 
effect on 
state 
expenditures. 
 
Tax elasticity 
measure 
positive and 
significant. 
Craig and 
Heins  
(1980) 
50 US 
states 
Pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional 
1970 and 
1975 
OLS and 
TSLS 
Per capita 
state 
expenditure, 
expenditure 
as a 
percentage of 
income. 
ACIR 
estimates of 
elasticity 
income of 
state taxes. 
 
Per capita personal income, 
per capita federal aid, 
population density, 
percentage of population 
urban, percentage of 
population > 18, percentage 
of state and local 
expenditures sourced locally. 
Positive and 
significant 
relationship 
between tax 
elasticity and 
expenditure. 
DiLorenzo 
(1982a) 
66 US 
counties 
Cross-
sectional 
changes 
between 
1967 and 
1977 
OLS Change in 
per capita 
expenditures 
Income 
elasticity 
(Oates). 
Change in population, 
change in population density, 
change in per capita real 
income, change in 
intergovernmental revenue. 
Tax elasticity 
significant 
though 
negative. 
Baker  
(1983) 
50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
1975 
OLS (Log-
linear) 
Per capita 
state tax 
liability 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity,  
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity.  
Per capita income, 
percentage of males with 
education < 12 years, per 
capita mineral shipments, 
per capita hotel receipts, per 
capita manufacturing value 
added, per capita lagged 
debt.  
 
Income 
elasticity 
measure 
positive 
though 
insignificant. 
Feenburg 
and Rosen 
(1987) 
49 US 
states 
Pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional 
1978-
1983 
OLS and 
TSLS (log-
linear) 
Change in 
state 
government 
expenditure 
per capita. 
Income 
elasticity 
(Feenburg and 
Rosen). 
Change in per capita grants, 
change in state-local 
expenditure, change in per 
capita personal income, 
population, change in 
population. 
No 
significant 
effect of 
income 
elasticity on 
expenditure 
growth. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Hunter and 
Scott  
(1987) 
40 US 
states 
Pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional 
1976-
1983 
Logit Dummy 
variable if 
the state 
decreased 
income taxes 
during the 
year. 
Measure of 
progressivity 
of state 
income tax. 
Proportional change; in GNP 
deflator, state income, state 
revenues, population.  
States with a 
higher 
degree of 
income 
elasticity 
have a higher 
probability 
of cutting tax 
rates. 
Misiolek and 
Elder  
(1988) 
50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
Changes 
between 
1967 and 
1984. 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Real tax 
revenues per 
capita, real 
state-local 
expenditures 
per capita. 
Income 
elasticity 
(Oates), 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
visible tax 
concentration 
ratio. 
Per capita personal income, 
population, average monthly 
salary of state-local 
employees, dummy for state 
expenditure limit, tax export 
measure, variability of taxes 
over period, variance of 
income over period, State 
share of state-local 
expenditures. 
Tax elasticity 
positive and 
significant in 
tax revenues 
only. 
Greene and 
Hawley 
(1991) 
40 US 
states 
Pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional 
Unlagged 
1977-83  
lagged 
1978-84 
Logit Discrete 
variable for 
tax code 
change 
Income 
elasticity 
(Feenburg and 
Rosen). 
Change in GNP deflator, 
rate of change in nominal 
income,  change in revenue, 
revenue at beginning of year, 
rate of population change. 
Highly 
income 
elastic tax 
structures 
will cut rates 
to prevent 
over-
expansion 
(as for 
Hunter and 
Scott). 
Heyndels 
and 
Smolders 
(1994) 
302 
Flemish 
municipal-
ities Cross-
sectional  
1990 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditure. 
(Herfindahl ) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity , 
percentage of 
non-owner 
occupied 
residences, 
grant income 
equivalent 
divided by 
total income. 
Population, median voter tax 
share, median voter total 
disposable income. 
No empirical 
support for 
revenue-
elasticty 
hypothesis. 
Dollery and 
Worthington 
(1995a) 
7 
Australian 
states. 
Pooled 
time-series, 
cross-
sectional 
(1982-
1992) 
OLS and 
GLS 
(linear and 
log-linear) 
Total 
expenditure 
and total 
expenditure 
net of grants 
and transfers. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity, ratio 
of direct to 
indirect taxes, 
dummy 
variables for 
reliance on 
grant income. 
Population, median voter 
income, proportion of 
poulation under 19 years, 
proportion of population 
over 65 years, population 
density, dummies for large 
and small states. 
No empirical 
support for 
revenue-
elasticty 
hypothesis. 
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(a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies, intervals time series. Where two dates are given, different years for some cross-
sectional variables have been used. (b) OLS/GLS/TSLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares and Two-Stage Least 
Squares respectively. (c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated. (d) Italicised 
independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
5. The "Flypaper Effect" of Grants and Utility Profits 
 
5.1 The Flypaper Effect 
A further form of fiscal illusion is the flypaper effect, which holds that a tendency exists for 
categorical lump-sum grants to increase public expenditure by more than an equivalent increase in 
income from other sources (Dougan and Kenyon, 1988, p. 159). The term "flypaper effect" itself is 
attributed by Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Marshall (1989) to Arthur Okun's 
observation that "money sticks where it hits". First modelled by Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 
(1979) and Oates (1979), the theory holds that budget-maximising political agents (politicians and 
bureaucrats) conceal the lump-sum nature of grant revenues. Instead of the income being returned to 
tax-payers, either directly via a rebate or a indirectly via a reduction in tax contributions, the grant is 
used to expand the public budget.  This is accomplished by political agents fostering an illusion that 
in addition to actual average tax rates falling, there has been a reduction in the marginal tax-price of 
the public good.  As a result the electorate is willing to support a higher level of spending at the 
recipient level than they would have if the fiscal parameters were correctly perceived. 
Three distinct groups of researchers have investigated the issue of the flypaper effect empirically.  
Firstly, some have incorporated grant distortions into studies directed at other forms of fiscal 
illusion, such as the revenue-complexity or elasticity hypotheses. These include Oates (1975), 
Wagner (1976), Goetz (1977), Munley and Greene (1978), Craig and Heines (1980), DiLorenzo 
(1982b) and Breeden and Hunter (1985).  In general, the results have indicated that 
intergovernmental grants are an important determinant of the level of public good expenditure. The 
second and third groups are those that have directed their studies to the question of the flypaper 
effect directly.  The first of these are writers in the vein of Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) 
and Oates (1979) who argued that grants reduce the average price of recipient public goods, and that 
voters base their allocative decisions on this price, rather than the actual marginal tax-price.  The 
second group includes Winer (1983) and Logan (1986) who have observed that grants cause voters 
to view their tax-burden as being transferred to other jurisdictions.  Regardless of this distinction, 
both groups view grants as reducing the perceived marginal cost of the public good, and thereby 
biasing public expenditure upwards.  These approaches are discussed below. 
Winer (1983, p. 127) began his study by observing that "...there is an obvious temptation for 
politicians to foster the belief that the cost of public services will fall disproportionately on 
someone else".  In so doing he provided the rationale for the analysis of a federal system in which 
spending and taxation decisions are separated, and accordingly may have a systematic and biased 
effect on the level of expenditures. A federal structure is prone to fiscal illusion of this form, 
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regardless of whether the voter is aware or unaware of aid, or of the status of the local government 
(donor or recipient).  If the voter is unaware of aid s/he may perceive a reduction in costs because of 
a higher portion of government spending in financing expenditures.  If the voter is aware of aid, 
illusion may still prevail since the voter may well be unaware of their own provincial status (grantor 
tax share > local tax share) or that all communities in some sense finance a portion of aid to other 
provinces (intergovernmental-complexity) (Logan, 1986, p. 1310). Utilising Canadian provincial 
data, Winer (1983, p. 127) reasoned that since federal taxation is levied nationally, federal grants-
in-aid may induce a belief among a recipient provinces voters that public services are being 
financed by non-residents. As a result grants, and especially unconditional grants, reduce the tax-
price of provincial public goods and may well bias expenditures upward.  This may be the case even 
if it were not possible to shift the taxation burden externally.  As shown in Table 3, Winer's analysis 
regressed net provincial expenditures against provincial income, federal grants and interprovincial 
grants.  He also included dummies for the different categories of recipient and donor provinces.  
Winer found that the results indicated that the grant system did increase expenditureand that the 
elasticity of grants with respect to expenditure for "poor" jurisdictions (recipient) is roughly twice 
as large as for "rich" jurisidictions (donor). 
Logan (1986), and later Hammes and Wills (1987), modified Winer's (1983) "partial equilibrium" 
approach by incorporating the effect of fiscal illusion on the grantor governments tax-price as well 
as that of the recipient.  Logan based his analysis on the fact that although voters were subject to 
incomplete information they were still rational, and that they were faced with the perception that 
federal taxes were rising but services were not, and that state taxes were falling but services were 
not (Logan, 1986, p. 1306).  From this he surmised that the contrasting effects of misperceived tax-
prices would mean an upward bias of recipient expenditures, and a downward bias of donor 
expenditures exclusive of grants.  As shown in Table 3, Logan (1986) regressed per capita federal 
non-aid expenditure against per capita measures of income, federal aid, state expenditure and 
unemployment for a US national time-series.  The results indicated that a negative relationship did 
indeed exist between the level of federal expenditures on aid, and the level of federal non-aid 
expenditures; proof that modification of tax-prices occurred at the donor level (Logan, 1986, p. 
1317).  Such results imply that tax-prices were modified in the opposite direction for recipient 
expenditures, supporting the fiscal illusion hypothesis (O'Brien and Shieh, 1990, p. 201).  Hammes 
and Wills (1987) used an identical analysis for Canadian data, and arrived at a similar conclusion.  
In terms of the approach of Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979), Grossman 
(1990) and Marshall (1991) are more recent examples.  Grossman approached the question of 
flypaper illusion by arguing that the degree of illusion encompassed in grants was a function of the 
level of indirectness.  A federal grant, for example, would be more indirect or remote than a state 
grant in terms of local government finance, and as a result induce a higher level of local 
expenditures (Grossman, 1990, p. 314). Grossman (1990) regressed expenditures for local 
government areas against various socio-economic variables and categories of grants, both federal 
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and state, conditional and unconditional. The results bolstered earlier studies (Courant, Gramlich 
and Rubinfeld, 1979; Oates, 1979) in supporting the stimulatory effects of grants. Employing a 
somewhat different methodology, Marshall (1989; 1991) used an exogenous illusion variable, 
namely tax-windfalls, to analyse the flypaper illusionary hypothesis. Using a set of socio-economic 
indicators (including the windfall) and a level of state expenditures, Marshall (1991, p. 1343) found 
no systematic effect of the tax windfalls on the level of state expenditure.  
Despite strong empirical support for the flypaper effect, several alternative hypotheses have been 
developed.  Romer and Rosenthal (1979) show that where the public budgetary agenda is 
dominated by political agents, the outcome may be determined by threat tactics.  In this manner an 
upward bias in expenditures need not imply any systematic illusion such as the flypaper effect.  
Dougan and Kenyon (1988) offer an explanation of the flypaper effect being the result of lobbying 
by local pressure groups.  As a result the stimulative effect of grants need not be the outcome of a 
widespread tax-price illusion but rather the alteration of the relative wealth positions of various 
pressure groups (Dougan and Kenyon, 1988, p. 169).  Oates (1988) has utilised both the works of 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and Dougan and Kenyon (1988) to argue that normal political 
budgetary processes may fulfil the theoretical role of fiscal illusion in biasing expenditures 
upwards, and that the stimulatory effect of grants is incorrectly identified as being the result of 
flypaper illusion. 
5.2 Utility Profits 
An illusion closely related to that of the intergovernmental grants based flypaper effect is the public 
utility profit illusion.  First described by Puviani (1903), this approach recognises that utility or 
public domain profits are used in internal subsidisation to reduce the perceived tax-price of public 
good expenditure (Buchanan, 1967, p. 131).  The result is similar to the flypaper effect in that 
income, whether from grants or profits, that reduces the average tax-price is misperceived to 
decrease the more economically relevant marginal tax-price, thereby expanding the level of 
expenditure.  The only difference is that grants are exogenous rather than endogenous to local 
government ownership, in comparison with to utility profits. 
The only study directed at the disjunction between costs and benefits caused by utility profits has 
been undertaken by DiLorenzo (1982b).  Using reduced form expenditure equations similar to 
Wagner (1976) and Munley and Greene (1978), DiLorenzo (see Table 3) regressed per capita 
expenditures, inclusive and exclusive of utility profits, against various socio-economic variables 
and a dummy variable for internal subsidisation.  The results for the sample of New York state 
municipalities indicated that public utility profits did indeed bias expenditures upwards by reducing 
the perceived marginal tax-price, thereby supporting the fiscal illusion hypothesis (DiLorenzo, 
1982b, p. 249).  This result held for both expenditures in total and for that regression where only 
"own" revenues (exclusive of utility profits) were tested. However, despite the support offered by 
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DiLorenzo's (1982b) analysis, the model may be questioned in a similar manner to that of the 
flypaper effect. 
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TABLE 3. 
Summary of major studies of the "flypaper" effect  
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
DiLorenzo 
(1982b) 
116 New 
York 
municipal
ities 
Cross-
sectional 
1976 
OLS Per capita 
total 
expenditure 
and 
expenditures 
exclusive of 
utility profits 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity,  
dummy 
variable for 
municipalities 
practising 
internal 
subsidisation 
(utility 
profits). 
Population, per capita 
income, percentage non-
white income, 
intergovernmental income, 
average monthly wage. 
 
Positive and 
significant 
value for 
utility 
profits. 
Internal 
subsidisation 
(utility 
profits) 
increases the 
level of 
expenditure. 
Winer  
(1983) 
10 
Canadian 
provinces
, pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional.  
1952/53-
1969/70 
TSLS Net 
provincial 
expenditure 
Not applicable Per capita income (+ lagged 
income), federal grants 
(+lagged grants), grants to 
other provinces (+lagged 
other grants), dummies for 
population and provincial 
groups (donor and recipient). 
Expenditure 
separation 
reduces 
perceived 
tax-prices 
and increases 
expenditures. 
Grant 
elasticity  
higher in 
recipient 
provinces. 
Logan 
(1986) 
US 
national  
Time-
series 
1947-
1983 
OLS (linear 
and non-
linear) 
Per capita 
federal direct 
non-aid 
expenditure 
Not applicable Per capita income, per 
capita total federal aid to 
state and local expenditure, 
per capita total state and 
local expenditure, 
unemployment rate, dummy 
for war. 
Grants 
process 
modifies 
perceived 
tax-prices of 
recipient and 
donor 
expenditure. 
Hammes and 
Wills  
(1987) 
Canada 
national 
Time-
series 
1962-
1984 
OLS (log-
linear and 
nonlinear) 
Real per 
capita federal 
non-aid 
expenditures, 
real per 
capita 
recipient 
government 
expenditures. 
Not applicable Perceived price of grantor 
(federal) expenditures,per 
capita income, perceived 
price of recipient (provincial 
and local) expenditures. 
Results 
similar to 
that of Logan 
(1986). 
Alternative 
support for 
hypothesis of 
"fly-paper 
effect"  
Marshall 
(1989; 1991) 
50 US 
states 
Cross-
sectional 
1986 
TSLS Expenditure 
per capita 
 
Change in 
per capita 
expenditures. 
Estimated per 
capita tax 
windfall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per capita income, per capita 
intergovernmental revenue, 
price of public goods 
(employee salaries), 
population, state share of 
final expenditure on public 
goods, percentage urban 
population, population 
density. 
Per capita tax windfall. 
Windfall 
revenue 
exerts a 
positive 
though 
insignificant 
effect on 
expenditure.  
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Grossman 
(1990) 
136 
Virginian 
localities 
Cross-
sectional 
1982 and 
1983 
TSLS Three 
expenditure 
categories; 
education, 
public safety 
and general 
government 
admin. 
Federal and  
state 
unconditional 
grants, state 
unconditional 
grants, federal 
+ state 
categorical 
grants. 
Median household income, 
tax price (local) share, 
percentage urban 
population, percentage 
black. 
Uncondition-
al grants are 
positive and 
significant in 
increasing 
the level of 
expenditure. 
Stewart 
(1993) 
Australia 
National 
time-
series 
1949-
1992. 
OLS Total state 
and local 
government 
outlays. 
Not applicable National income, total net 
aid to all state and local 
governments, unemployment 
rate. 
Increase in 
grants 
associated 
with fall in 
own-purpose 
expenditures. 
Heyndels 
and 
Smolders 
(1994) 
302 
Flemish 
municipal-
ities Cross-
sectional  
1990 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditure. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity , 
percentage 
non-owner 
occupied, 
grant income 
divided by 
total income. 
Population, median voter tax 
share, median voter total 
disposable income. 
Positive and 
significant 
impact of 
grants on 
expenditure. 
Dollery and 
Worthington 
(1995a) 
7 
Australian 
states. 
Pooled 
time-series, 
cross-
sectional 
(1982-
1992) 
OLS and 
GLS (linear 
and log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditure 
and total 
expenditure 
net of grants 
and transfers. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity, ratio 
of direct to 
indirect taxes, 
dummy 
variables for 
reliance on 
grant income. 
Population, median voter 
income, proportion of 
poulation under 19 years, 
proportion of population 
over 65 years, population 
density, dummies for large 
and small states. 
Strong 
empirical 
support for 
the 
"flypaper" 
effect. 
Dollery and 
Worthington 
(1995b) 
Australia 
National 
time-
series 
1981-
1992 
OLS (linear 
and log-
linear) 
Per capita 
federal non-
grant 
expenditures. 
Not applicable Perceived price of grantor 
expenditures, per capita 
national income, perceived 
price of recipient 
expenditures, per capita 
state and local expenditures, 
unemployment rate. 
Support for 
"flypaper" 
effect at 
grantor level. 
(a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies, intervals time series. Where two dates are given, different years for some cross-
sectional variables have been used. (b) OLS/GLS/TSLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares and Two-Stage Least 
Squares respectively. (c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated. (d) Italicised 
independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
 
6. Renter Illusion 
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A fourth type of fiscal illusion that has received attention in the empirical literature is renter 
illusion.  In this approach, an increase in a jurisdiction's proportion of renters will ceteris paribus 
increase the level of expenditures. The presumption is that since the primary revenue of local 
governments is the property tax, only those voters directly levied (owners) will correctly perceive 
the tax-price of the local public good.  Whilst we could expect that higher property taxes will be 
passed onto renters via higher rents, the illusionary hypothesis argues that a disjunction exists 
between a rental voter's perception of the level of public good services and the level of rents paid.  
Even if the illusionary influence is not perfect, so long as the actual tax-price is underestimated, 
rental voters will support higher levels of public expenditure and would therefore bias expenditures 
upwards.  The ability of this group to increase the level of expenditure would then depend on the 
number of voters involved. 
The first empirical study of renter illusion was undertaken by Bergstrom and Goodman in 1973. In 
Bergstrom and Goodman's (1973) analysis of eight hundred and twenty-six US municipalities (see 
Table 4) the proportion of owner occupied households was one of several socio-economic variables 
against which general, police, and parks/recreation expenditures were regressed.  The resulting 
negative coefficient indicated that the level of local government expenditure was indeed a function 
of the proportion of renters in the community, assuming identical income levels. The hypothesis 
that renters were subject to a lower perceived tax-price than owners was therefore not falsified. 
Subsequent to the seminal argument of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), several studies verified the 
persistence of renter illusion in the tax price-rent nexus. Peterson (1975) found that renters do not 
think that they bear the full cost of property taxes. However, Lovell (1978) argued that renters 
believed landlords shifted a relatively large portion of the property tax onto them, whilst Gronberg 
(1980, p. 451) observed that "...the effects of property tax differentials on rental prices may be an 
implicit or hidden cost to the rental household", without the benefit of empirical support. Later 
studies (Heyndels and Smolders, 1994; Worthington, 1994) verified these findings, although 
Moomau and Morton (1992, p. 179) found evidence of variability in the illusionary influence. 
Despite the strong support of the renter illusion hypothesis since Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), 
most studies have given either implicit or explicit consideration of the alternate hypothesis of 
"renter rationality". In this approach, the apparent link between a jurisdictions proportion of renters 
and the systematic increase in expenditures is the result of rational, informed decisions on the 
behalf of voters, rather than any misperceptions of relevant fiscal parameters. Studies of this 
hypothesis may be divided into: early approaches that supported rational type-behaviour (Barr and 
Davis, 1966; Hanushek, 1975; Beck, 1984; Brazer and McCarty, 1987); those that qualified 
findings on renter illusion (Peterson, 1975; Oates, 1988; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994); and those 
that directly attack the theoretical foundations of renter illusion (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983; 1988). 
More generally, they may be discussed in terms of the incidence and distribution of property taxes 
amongst voters. 
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First, Barr and Davis (1966) argued that the market for rental properties would be unaffected by 
modifications in property tax. Given that the supply of such properties was fixed in the short run, 
and the demand for rental property did not depend on the tax rate, they proposed inter alia  that the 
property tax change would not be passed on to renters. Barr and Davis (1966, p. 152) added that 
"...in addition, the long run is indeed long in terms of tax shifting since sufficient time must be 
allowed for the tax to prevent what would have otherwise been a non-negligible addition to the 
stock of rental properties". The absence of effective shifting of property taxes onto renters, in both 
the short and long run, will ensure a lower tax price for renters, and voter outcomes consistent with 
rational decisions.  
Following Barr and Davis (1966), the issue of property tax-rent shifting has received some attention 
in the literature. Oates (1988) proposed certain circumstances where the burden of tax-expenditure 
increases would be shifted onto tenants as against owners; more specifically, "if the higher revenues 
are associated with improved local services, then the tax-expenditure increase should translate into 
a higher demand for rental housing...that will drive up rents" (Oates, 1988, p. 72). However, Oates 
noted where tax differentials do not reflect service differentials and where long leases existed there 
is a reduction in the present discounted value of any tax increase; the burden of tax may thus remain 
on the lessor. Peterson (1975) and Hanushek (1975) have also addressed the issue of tax-shifting, 
and more particularly in the case of the former, the role of time lags in rental contracts. Whilst 
much empirical work remains to be done, there does appear to be some evidence that renters may 
have significantly lower tax-prices than owner occupants. 
Second, a somewhat related renter rationality argument has been proposed by Martinez-Vazquez 
(1983). Quite apart from the plausible arguments that  renters differ from owner-occupiers in terms 
of both income (for instance, since renters have lower incomes they benefit from the progressive 
incidence of fiscal budgets) and general preference for public goods (for example, renters tend to 
have more school-age children) Martinez-Vazquez (1983, p. 244) proposed that the voting 
behaviour of renters will vary because they have a lower level of housing consumption expenditure, 
holding income constant. Since property taxes are often levied in proportion to the consumption of 
housing,  any increase in expenditure on publicly-provided goods will entail larger net benefits to 
renters than homeowners of the same income level. If we assume that renters vote rationally, 
increases in expenditure will be the result of such considerations, not renter illusion. In fact, such an 
outcome will be enhanced where renters have stronger preferences for the public good or where full 
tax shifting has not occurred. Accordingly, the lower the level of housing consumption expenditure 
or income for renters compared to owner-occupiers, and the higher the level of benefits of the 
former, the more likely voter outcomes are consistent with rational behaviour. Martinez-Vazquez 
(1983) tested the alternative hypothesis using data from a 1974 St Louis expenditure referendum. 
As shown in Table 4, the initial model regressed the number of "yes" votes favouring a higher level 
of expenditure against the percentage of renters and median income. The coefficient for the 
proportion of renters was positive and significant, prima facie  evidence of renter illusion 
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(Martinez-Vazquez, 1983, p. 241).  However, when the net benefits of the higher levels of 
expenditure were regressed against the percentage of renters and the median income, the results 
indicated that renters had voted rationally. Accordingly, whilst "the possibility of a certain degree of 
fiscal illusion in renter's behaviour cannot be excluded...[the present argument] provides sufficient 
bases to question the predominance, if not the validity, of the fiscal illusion hypothesis in 
explaining renters' behaviour" (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983, p. 244). 
TABLE 4. 
Summary of major studies of renter illusion 
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Barr and 
Davis  
(1966) 
64 Penn-
sylvanian 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1959 
OLS Per capita 
general, 
highway, 
judicial and 
other 
expenditures. 
Percentage of 
electorate 
owning 
property. 
Per capita assessed property 
value. 
Property 
holding an 
important 
determinant 
of 
expenditure 
decisions. 
Bergstrom 
and 
Goodman 
(1973) 
826 US 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1962 
OLS (log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditures 
on police, 
parks and 
total 
excluding 
education 
and welfare. 
Percentage  of 
municipal 
housing owner 
occupied. 
Number of households, tax 
share of median voter, 
median income, measure of 
the crowding of the public 
good, percentage population 
change, percentage non-
white,  of population > 65, 
population density. 
Negative and 
significant 
coefficient 
between 
percentage 
owner 
occupied and 
the level of 
general 
expenditures. 
Hanushek 
(1975) 
140 
Cleveland 
precincts  
Cross-
sectional 
1960 
OLS Probability 
of voter 
turnout, 
probability of 
voting in 
favour of 
expenditure 
increase. 
Percent homes 
owner-
occupied. 
Median income, value of 
owner-occupied dwelling, 
gross rent, ethnic 
breakdown, educational 
level, age level. 
Homeowners 
tend to vote 
more readily 
against 
increases in 
public 
expenditure. 
Peterson 
(1975) 
School 
districts in 
California 
Michigan 
N. Jersey  
N. York 
Kansas 
Cross-
sectional 
1968-71  
OLS 
(log-log) 
Desired 
school 
spending per 
pupil. 
Percentage of 
adult renters 
in school 
district. 
Dummy 
variable for 
renter status. 
Household income, property 
tax base value divided by 
property value per pupil, 
state aid per pupil, number 
of school children in 
household. 
The rental 
population of 
an area is 
associated 
with the 
demand for 
higher public 
service 
levels. 
Lovell  
(1978) 
136 
Connect-
icut towns 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS, GLS 
(linear and 
log-linear) 
Educational 
expenditure 
per pupil. 
Proportion of 
homes owner-
occupied in 
town. 
Percentage of population in 
poverty, median family 
income, skewness of income 
distribution, property per 
pupil, median school years, 
enrolments, percentage of 
Democrat voters. 
Expenditures 
negatively 
related to the 
level of 
owner 
occupied 
housing. 
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Gronberg 
(1980) 
83 
Chicago 
localities 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS, TSLS Total 
municipal 
expenditures. 
Percentage 
owner 
occupied in 
local  area. 
Labour force participation 
rate, percentage of non-
whites, per capita assessed 
value of property, median 
voter income, median voter 
tax share. 
Proportion of 
owner 
occupied 
negatively 
related to 
level of 
expenditures. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Martinez-
Vazquez 
(1983) 
Sundry 
St Louis 
precincts  
Cross-
sectional 
1974 
OLS "Yes" votes 
on increased 
expenditures 
in police, 
fire, parks, 
highway, 
library. 
Net benefits 
of increased 
expenditures. 
Percentage of 
renters in 
precinct. 
 
Median income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher 
proportion of 
"yes" votes 
attributable 
to high rates 
of renter 
occupation. 
Results also 
suggest that 
"yes" votes 
on the behalf 
of renters are 
rational 
rather than 
illusionary. 
Beck  
(1984) 
219 
California 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1971-74 
NLLS Per capita 
total 
expenditure. 
Percent of 
owner-
occupied 
housing. 
Per capita grant aid, tax 
base per household, per 
capita sales tax revenue, 
median family income, 
percentage non-white, 
percentage over 65 years, 
population, Gini coefficient. 
Demand for 
municipal 
services is a 
nonmono- 
tonic 
function of 
income, with 
minimum 
varying 
across 
communities. 
Brazer and 
McCarty 
(1987) 
600 
Connec- 
ticut New 
Jersey 
Virginia 
districts 
Cross-
sectional 
1981-82 
OLS  
(log-linear) 
School 
expenditure 
per pupil. 
Municipal 
expenditure 
per capita. 
Proportion of 
owner-
occupiers. 
Tax price, state and federal 
aid, proportion aged, 
education, poverty ratio, 
enrolment rates, population 
growth and density, 
nonresident and resident 
pupils, urbanisation. 
Coefficient 
on owner-
occupier 
negative and 
significant. 
Schokkaert 
(1987) 
2404 
persons in 
Purrs, 
Belgium 
1986 
Logit Probability 
of favouring 
increase in 
expenditure. 
Dummy 
variable for 
home-
ownership. 
Dummy variables for age, 
unemployment, urban status, 
job description, sports 
activity; measures of age, 
education, sex, income, tax. 
Homeowners 
appear more 
favourable to 
increases in 
expenditure. 
Schwab and 
Zampelli 
(1987) 
73 
Maryland 
cities and 
counties 
Cross-
sectional 
1978 
NLLS Per capita 
police 
expenditure. 
Proportion of 
owner-
occupiers. 
Per capita income, price, 
grants, percentage non-
white, unemployed, high 
school graduates.  
No 
relationship 
between 
percentage of 
homeowners 
and police 
expenditure. 
Moomau and 
Morton 
(1992) 
428 New 
Orleans 
precincts 
Cross-
sectional 
1982 
Logit Probability 
of voting in 
favour of 
change in 
property tax. 
Percentage of 
renter  and 
homeowner 
households. 
Income, rental  contract 
value, percentage white, 
percentage black, homestead 
exemption value.  
The higher 
the value of 
rent the more 
likely renters 
will perceive 
the tax 
burden. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Measure of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Heyndels and 
Smolders 
(1994) 
302 
Flemish 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional  
1990 
OLS  
(log-linear) 
Total 
expenditure. 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
(Oates) 
income 
elasticity , 
percentage 
non-owner 
occupied, 
grant income 
divided by 
total income. 
Population, median voter tax 
share, median voter total 
disposable income, measure 
of revenue-complexity, 
income elasticity measure, 
grant income equivalent 
divided by total income. 
No 
relationship 
between 
occupancy 
status and 
expenditure 
outcomes. 
Carroll and 
Yinger 
(1994) 
147 
Boston 
towns 
Cross-
sectional 
1980 
OLS, 
2SLS, Box-
Cox. 
Median rents, 
index of 
public 
service 
quality, tax 
rate. 
Fraction of 
rental housing 
units. 
Rental characteristics, 
population density, distance 
to CBD/highway, population 
growth rate. 
Property tax 
increases are 
exactly off-
set by 
increases in 
rents. 
Provides 
support for 
renter 
rationality. 
Worthington  
(1994) 
46 
Austral-
ian LGAs 
Cross-
sectional 
1991 
OLS TSLS 
(linear and 
log-linear) 
Total and per 
capita 
expenditure. 
Proportion 
owner-
occupied, 
(Herfindahl) 
revenue-
complexity, 
dummies for 
grant and 
utility 
reliance, 
indirectness of 
revenue 
system. 
Rateable area and roads, 
median voter tax price, 
income, population, 
proportion of population 
over 65 years, measure of 
revenue-complexity, 
dummies for grant and utility  
reliance, ndirectness of 
revenue system. 
Proportion 
owner-
occupied and 
expenditure 
negatively 
related. 
a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies - where two dates are given, different years for some cross-sectional variables 
have been used. b) OLS/GLS/TSLS/NLLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares, Two-Stage Least Squares and 
Non-Linear Least Squares respectively. c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated. 
d) Italicised independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
 
7. Debt Illusion 
The final form of fiscal illusion is debt illusion. Here voters are more aware of the costs of public 
sector programs if they are paid for through current taxation rather than public-sector borrowing.  
Generally, this results from imperfect information available to individuals on the time path of the 
future benefits or costs of governmental activity.  Accordingly, "the excess of the present value of 
perceived future net benefits over the present value of actual net future benefits represents an 
illusionary addition to wealth which can affect real consumption and investment decisions" (Floyd 
and Hynes, 1978, p. 381).  The general presumption is that since a price differential exists between 
the perceived tax-price of debt based expenditure and that of taxation, reliance on debt will ceteris 
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paribus  imply a larger expenditure on the public good. Buchanan (1967; 1982) proposed two types 
of debt-illusion.  The first a "Vickrey-type" decision illusion where an individuals subjective 
assessment of debt on future tax liabilities was undervalued; and the "Puviani-type" behavioural 
distinction where the subjective assessment of the diminution of the value of assets are not treated 
in the same manner as a lump-sum taxation payment. Buchanan (1967, p. 161) maintains that for 
both of these approaches subjective criteria dominate at the time of the selection of debt, with the 
objective costs only recognised in subsequent time-periods.  
One of the first approaches to the question of debt in governmental finance was undertaken by 
Puviani (1967). Puviani (1967) accepted the basic Ricardian proposition that the payment of an 
annual tax in perpetuity and a lump-sum extraordinary capital payment were in some sense 
equivalent (Buchanan, 1967; 1982; Buchanan and Roback, 1987)). However, Puviani (1967) argued 
that individual taxpayers do not make allocative decisions on this premise. In fact, individuals will 
not be indifferent to the selection of debt or taxation in violation of Ricardian equivalence, so that 
future tax liabilities are undervalued because of the issue of "control" (Buchanan, 1967, p. 132). 
Thus "...the individual retains control over a capital value which, even though fully offset by the 
liability stemming from the capitalised value of future taxes, remains desirable" (Buchanan, 1967, 
p. 132). An alternative to Puviani's (1967) and Buchanan's (1967; 1982) approach is that proposed 
by Floyd and Hynes (1978).  Here an individual's decisions on future tax and debt liabilities are 
based on two sources of information: firstly, information derived from the current political process, 
like policy platforms; and secondly, analysis of past trends in government expenditure and taxation 
(Floyd and Hynes).  Floyd and Hynes argue that unless marked (and predictable) changes  occur in 
the current political profile, decisions are likely to be (rationally) based upon past behaviour, and 
therefore debt illusion is inclined to arise when the past trends do not accurately predict future 
outcomes. In both approaches an illusionary effect is created when rational individuals prefer debt 
to current taxation due to imperfect information. 
Given that a fiscal illusion exists when taxpayers underestimate the present discounted value of 
future tax liabilities under debt finance, it becomes necessary to identify the feedback of debt 
related choices.  In general, since assets and not individuals are taxed at the local level (though not 
necessarily at that of the state), the empirical question becomes one of the efficacy of community 
debts capitalisation into individual asset values (Yinger, 1982). The presumption is that the 
preference for debt exists under illusion because of perceived tax-price advantage; that is, 
undercapitalisation, even though under "Ricardian equivalence" no differential exists. Since debt 
based programs have a lower perceived tax-price, higher levels of expenditure will be demanded, 
and the debt illusion will have succeeded in biasing expenditures upwards. 
The issue of debt capitalisation suggested a possible test for the existence of debt illusion to writers 
such as Daly (1969) and Oates (1969). As Oates (1988, pp. 76-77) has observed: 
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 Consider two otherwise identical communities that undertake identical capital projects.  One 
community, call it A, finances the project out of current revenues, while community B 
chooses to employ bond finance so as to spread out the payments for the project over future 
years.  At the end of the current year, the sole differences between a "typical resident" of A 
and B will be that the latter will have a future tax liability whose present discounted value 
equals the recent differential tax payment by the resident of A.  In a world of mobile 
consumers, this future tax liability associated with residing in community B will become 
capitalised into lower property values in B ...other things being equal, we should find, that if 
there is a debt illusion, that the future tax liabilities associated with the debt are not fully 
capitalised into local property values. 
Earlier Oates (1969) undertook a somewhat more holistic approach to local government finance 
than that required for the issue of debt illusion, which nevertheless does throw light on the issue of 
empirical analysis (see Table 5).  Using a sample of municipalities, Oates (1969, p. 958) attempted 
to observe the impact of local expenditure programs and property taxes on property values.  
Regressing housing values against various socio-economic determinates and municipal tax rates and 
expenditures, Oates (1969, p. 965) found that housing values are negatively related to tax rates and 
positively related to expenditures. Oates (1969) essentially undertook this analysis as an empirical 
test of Tiebout mobility.  He used the results to argue that consumers will select a community (at 
least in terms of housing value) by maximising net benefit, taking into account the positive effect of 
higher expenditure levels and the detrimental effect of higher tax-prices. Such outcomes have 
persistently been verified in the numerous housing capitalisation studies that followed. (See 
Chaudry-Shah (1985) for a survey of these cross and intra-jurisdictional fiscal impacts).  However, 
these studies do not provide an adequate test of the debt illusion hypothesis. In general, this is 
because they are concerned with the capitalisation of expenditure financed solely by current 
taxation, not with the differentials that may exist between identical communities that finance 
expenditure with either debt or current taxation. 
A study more closely related to debt illusion was undertaken by Epple and Schipper (1981).  In this 
approach (see Table 5) a cross-sectional study regressed median home values against a standard set 
of socio-economic variables and a proxy for estimated unfunded pension liabilities.  The 
hypothesised value for the unfunded service requirement was unitary and negative indicating that 
municipal residents expected pension obligations to be funded from local taxes.  If full 
capitalisation of the liability was found, then the presumption would be that debt illusion did not 
exist and that the tax-price of debt funded expenditure was accurately perceived.  The results failed 
to  support the hypothesis of no capitalisation.  However, Epple and Schipper (1981, p. 170) noted 
that further work was required, whilst Inman (1981) observed that the expected differential between 
estimated (underestimated) and actual unfunded pension liabilities was crucial to any examination. 
Subsequently, Inman (1982, pp. 69-70) reexamined the issue of pension funding, finding that the 
continued controversy on the correct estimation of capitalisation models, and the lack of consistent 
and independent measures of unfunded liabilities, was a significant reason why only Epple and 
Schipper (1981) had addressed this issue. 
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Finally, in an international analysis Dalamagas (1993) investigated the conflicting views of the 
traditional Keynesian approaches to the stimulatory effect of debt financed tax-cuts compared with 
that of Ricardian equivalence where tax and debt finance are equivalent, and therefore tax-cuts are 
inconsequential. Regressing the level of private sector consumption against tax revenue, 
government debt/deficit and inflation, Dalamagas found that the substitution of debt for taxes is 
misinterpreted as a net addition to wealth and private per capita consumption expenditures rise. 
However, the relevance of the Dalamagas (1992; 1993) analysis to the present study is limited. This 
is because unlike the majority of fiscal illusion studies, Dalamagas (1992; 1993) is concerned with 
the impact of debt illusion on private consumption and not on public expenditure. 
TABLE 5. 
Summary of major studies of debt illusion 
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Estimation 
technique 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
(c) 
Measure(s) of 
Fiscal Illusion 
Employed (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Major 
Findings 
Oates (1969) 
 
53 New 
Jersey 
municipal
ities 
Cross-
sectional 
1961 and 
1963. 
OLS (log-
linear) and 
TSLS 
Median  
residential 
home value 
Degree of 
capitalisation. 
Effective tax-rate (average 
1956-60), distance to urban 
centre (Manhattan), median 
number of rooms, 
percentage of houses built 
since 1950, median family 
income, percentage of 
families with lower level 
income. 
Taxes and 
expenditures
are 
capitalised 
into housing 
values.  
Epple and 
Schipper 
(1981) 
130 
Pennsylva
nian 
municipal
-ities and 
57 
Pittsburgh 
municipal
-ities. 
Cross-
sectional 
1976  
OLS (log-
linear) 
Median 
value of 
residential 
property. 
Degree of 
capitalisation 
School expenditures per 
capita, effective tax rate, 
unfunded service cost/ 
market value of property, 
median income, travel time 
to CBD, proportion of homes 
lacking some or all plumbing 
facilities. 
Unfunded 
service costs 
(proxy for 
debt)  either 
insignificant-
ly positive or 
excessively 
negative 
(greater than 
1) indicating 
over 
capitalisation 
Dalamagas 
(1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dalamagas 
(1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
countries 
Pooled 
time-
series, 
cross-
sectional  
1978/79-
1987/88 
 
51 
countries 
Cross-
sectional 
based on 
10 year 
averages 
1980-
1989 
OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS  
Real per 
capita 
private 
consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real per 
capita 
private 
consumption. 
Consumption 
expenditures 
relative to 
debt levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumption 
expenditures 
relative to 
debt levels. 
GDP and lagged GDP,  
Government expenditure and 
lagged government 
expenditure, budget deficit 
and lagged deficit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratio of taxes, deficit to 
GDP, inflation, dummies 
(debt/GDP) for debted 
(>46%), intermediate (35% - 
45%) and solvent countries 
(<35%). 
 
 
The 
subsitution 
of debt for 
taxes causes 
a revision in 
private 
consumption 
decisions. 
Debt illusion 
absent in 
high debt-
GDP ratio 
countries, 
present in 
low debt-
GDP ratio 
countries. 
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a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies - where two dates are given, different years for some cross-sectional variables 
have been used. b) OLS/GLS/TSLS/NLLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares, Two-Stage Least Squares and 
Non-Linear Least Squares respectively. c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated.d) 
Italicised independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
In summarising past empirical studies of fiscal illusion several dominant themes emerge.  The first 
is that, in general, results have been mixed. Whilst many studies have found unqualified support for 
a particular hypothesis, others have found the implications for fiscal illusion inconclusive.  This is 
in part attributable to the diversity of data and models employed.  In addition, the heterogeneity of 
results also applies across the different manifestations of fiscal illusion.  Moreover, significant 
attention has been directed to the issues of revenue-complexity, revenue-elasticity and renter 
illusion, whereas few resources have been deployed to other forms of fiscal illusion, particularly 
debt illusion.  Even more noticeable is the failure of most empirical studies to incorporate more 
than one illusionary hypothesis and few studies have analysed more than two (Wagner, 1976; 
DiLorenzo, 1982a, 1982b; Martinez-Vazquez, 1988; Grossman, 1990; Worthington, 1994; Dollery 
and Worthington, 1995a; 1995b). Secondly, the ability to find empirical support for the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis is persistently qualified by alternative hypotheses and the endogeneity of some 
variables.  Whilst some of these issues may be addressed by careful econometric analysis, it may 
not be possible to resolve fully the psychological black box in which decisions under incomplete 
and partial information are undertaken. Finally, the body of theory concerning fiscal illusion is 
incomplete.  Issues such as the derivation of suitable proxies for illusionary variables and the 
usefulness of these variables remain contentious.  It may well be that the assumptions used in past 
approaches to fiscal illusion lack the theoretical rigour required for empirical analysis.  
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